The mainstream approach to protecting the privacy of mobile users in location-based services (LBSs) is to alter (e.g., perturb, hide, and so on) the users' actual locations in order to reduce exposed sensitive information. In order to be effective, a location-privacy preserving mechanism must consider both the privacy and utility requirements of each user, as well as the user's overall exposed locations (which contribute to the adversary's background knowledge).
INTRODUCTION
The widespread use of smart mobile devices with continuous connection to the Internet has fostered the development of a variety of successful location-based services (LBSs).
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A large body of research has focused on developing location-privacy protection mechanisms (LPPMs) that allow users to make use of LBSs while limiting the amount of disclosed sensitive information [Beresford and Stajano 2003; Chow and Golle 2009; Gedik and Liu 2005; Hoh et al. 2007 ; Kalnis et al. 2007; Meyerowitz and Roy Choudhury 2009] . These protection mechanisms are based on increasing the uncertainty of the adversary about a user's true whereabouts by hiding locations from the LBS, or sending perturbed or fake locations. However, more often than not, the evaluation of these designs disregards that the adversary might have some prior knowledge about users' movements as well as about the algorithm implemented by the LPPM. It has been shown [Shokri et al. 2011a ] that such information allows a strategic adversary to reduce one's uncertainty of the user's true location; thus, prior evaluations overestimate the location privacy offered by a given protection system.
Furthermore, previous work usually targets protection against localization attacks [Shokri et al. 2011a [Shokri et al. , 2011b , that is, to protect the users' whereabouts when disclosing an obfuscated location to the LBS. Protecting the user's current location is intricately bound with protecting the user's past and future locations. Different LBSs require the user location to be updated at different rates. Some require frequent updates, such as applications for obtaining local traffic information-for example, Beat the Traffic, INRIX Traffic Maps, Routes & Alerts; or finding nearby points of interest, local events, or nearby friends-for example, Google Maps. Others can function perfectly well with just a single location, such as Foursquare, Google Latitude/Google+ Local, or, in general, location check-in and location-tagging services that require only sporadic location exposures. The frequency of location exposures has a severe impact on the privacy protection offered by an LPPM since locations exposed in quick succession are highly correlated, leaking a lot of information that allows the adversary to reduce one's uncertainty of the user's immediate past or future whereabouts.
In this work, we propose an LPPM design methodology that explicitly accounts for a strategic adversary, allowing for a more accurate estimation of the privacy protection that can be achieved by these LPPMs. The design methodology takes location correlation into account to effectively protect a user's location privacy along the user's trajectory; for example, it provides protection against inference attacks that aim at reconstructing the user's location in the past or predicting the user's location in the future based on what the user shares at any moment. We focus on user-centric LPPMs, in which privacy decisions are made locally by the user, rather than by a third party that acts as an anonymizer [Gruteser and Grunwald 2003] . These LPPMs require no changes in infrastructure or any cooperation from other users, from third parties, or from the LBS. Therefore, they can be directly integrated into the mobile devices.
The goal of our methodology is to allow system designers to find the optimal LPPM against a strategic adversary who, knowing each user's LBS access pattern, observation history, and the LPPM's obfuscation algorithm, employs the theoretically strongest attack to infer users' whereabouts. The challenge is to design such an optimal protection mechanism when the inference attack, that the strategic adversary will choose depending on the mechanism being designed, is a priori unknown to the designer. To overcome this obstacle, instead of making assumptions about the adversary's inference algorithm (i.e., instead of assuming limits in the adversary's power), our approach anticipates the optimal attack. Additionally, our methodology constrains the search space to LPPMs that obfuscate locations in such a way that the quality of the LBS response is not degraded below a threshold imposed by the user, guaranteeing the required service quality for the user. We assume that this user-specified service quality constraint is also known to the adversary.
We formalize the problem of finding the optimal LPPM anticipating the optimal inference attack as an instance of a zero-sum Bayesian Stackelberg game. In this game, a leader and a follower interact strategically, with each one's gain being the loss of the other. The leader decides on a strategy knowing that it will be observed by the follower; the follower will optimize a choice based on this observation. In our scenario, the user is the leader and the adversary is the follower. Then, the game precisely models that the adversary knows the user's choice of protection mechanism and will use that knowledge to improve the attack's effectiveness. We further extend the classic formulation of a Stackelberg game with an extra constraint to ensure that the service quality is satisfactory for the user. This enables us to find the optimal point in the trade-off curve between privacy and service quality that satisfies users' requirements. We prove that the solution to our location privacy games can be obtained using linear programs that must be solved by the user along the trace of the user's movements, since, as the user reveals more of one's location over time, the adversary's knowledge and observation history evolves. Ours is, to the best of our knowledge, the first analytical framework that allows us to integrate adversarial knowledge in the design methodology of optimal user-centric privacy protection mechanisms.
We apply our methodology to design LPPMs for various scenarios in which we aim protect not just the current user location, but also past locations (i.e., the LPPM's current obfuscation is chosen so as not to compromise the privacy of past locations), future locations (i.e., the current obfuscation should be compatible with potential future locations where the user might go next), and transitions between locations (i.e., obfuscations of successive locations should be chosen jointly).
We evaluate the effectiveness of the designed LPPMs using real location traces, showing that, for a given user's LBS access pattern and service-quality threshold, our game-theoretic approach enables us to simultaneously find the optimal LPPM and the optimal attack against it. We confirm that there is a trade-off between the maximum achievable privacy and the service quality, but, once a certain privacy level is reached, loosening the quality requirements does not necessarily result in a privacy gain. We also find that the location-privacy advantage of the optimal LPPM over a suboptimal LPPM is larger when the quality requirement is tighter. The theory is that, when the quality requirement is loose, both LPPMs are allowed to add so much noise that the attacker's observation is very uninformative about the user's true location. In contrast, when the quality requirement is tight, the optimal LPPM makes a better allocation of the limited noise it is allowed to inject.
In summary, our proposal for designing LPPMs showcases four contributions:
(1) Our LPPMs assume that the adversary is strategic, because, as Shannon's maxim states: "One ought to design systems under the assumption that the enemy will immediately gain full familiarity with them." (2) Our LPPMs are user-centric, needing no changes in the infrastructure, nor any trusted third parties, because we believe that this would facilitate their deployment. (3) Our LPPMs take into account that successively visited locations are correlated, which dramatically changes the way that they should be protected. (4) Our LPPMs are optimal by design in the scenarios for which they are designed; thus, they offer the best possible privacy protection against the best possible attack.
We motivate and state the problem in Sections 2 and 3. We formalize the problem as a Bayesian Stackelberg game between user and adversary in Section 4. We show Fig. 1 . A user's real location ( ) and obfuscated exposed location ( ). In principle, the attacker has 1 chance in 9 to accurately locate the user. However, if the attacker knows that row 1 is a lake, or that the protection mechanism always produces a 3x3 square centered on the real location, then the user's privacy is lower than naïvely expected.
how to design optimal protection mechanisms in different scenarios in Section 5, and evaluate our method in Section 6. We discuss the related work in Section 7.
MOTIVATION: LOCATION PRIVACY AGAINST STRATEGIC ADVERSARIES
This section delves into the need to consider, at the time of designing an LPPM, strategic adversaries that use their knowledge of user behavior, LPPM operation, and correlation between successively visited locations, since the use of such knowledge has great impact on the maximum level of privacy achievable.
Strategic Adversaries Use Prior Knowledge on Users' Behavior and LPPM Design to Reduce Their Uncertainty
Consider a user who issues a location-based query from location (2,2), , in the area depicted in Figure 1 . Instead of revealing the true location, the user employs an LPPM that outputs a 3x3 square, , centered on the true location. The hope is that this mechanism masks the user's location, making any location within the exposed square equally probable in the eyes of the attacker.
There are two problems with this naïve approach. First, if the adversary has background information about the user's mobility, the probability of the user being in any location is not uniform anymore. For example, the adversary may have access to topographic information about the area in which the user moves, which changes the probability of the user visiting locations-the user is much more likely to be at the shore of a lake than in its middle. This probability also changes if the attacker has access to behavioral information about the user, for example, the user's favorite locations reported in social networks, or demographic information such as age, which lead to likely locations of that particular demographic group. Second, if the adversary knows how the mechanism works, the probability of the user being in any location may also change. In this example, such knowledge would completely break the user's privacy. Upon observing the reported square, the attacker would always correctly infer that the user is located at (2,2), the center of the square.
These examples show that not considering a strategic adversary with access to background knowledge leads to an overestimation of the privacy achievable by an LPPM.
Strategic Adversaries Use Correlation to Reduce Their Uncertainty
Users' movements are not isolated discrete events. Rather, users follow a trajectory to go from one place to another. Along this trajectory, users may query a location-based service, continuously in time or only at selected spots, to obtain useful information concerning the surroundings or the arrival point. However, even if not all points in the trajectory are exposed to the service provider, the correlation between consecutive positions implies that inferring just one of them reveals information about past and future positions. For instance, spatiotemporal constraints derived from maximum user velocity may reveal with high probability the route followed by a user between two successive location exposures.
The correlation between successively shared locations depends on two factors: randomness of user mobility patterns and LBS access frequency. The former relates to how predictable a user's future location is given the user's current location. The latter defines the rate at which the LBS provider can sample the user's trajectory. These two factors have opposite effects on correlation: High randomness decreases correlation between successively exposed locations, since the current position contains less information about past and future events than when movements are deterministic. In contrast, high LBS access frequency increases correlation: the user has little time to move between two LBS accesses and exposed locations are nearer to each other than when access frequency is low. We now show, through a toy example, how correlation between successive locations can decrease the uncertainty of the adversary about past and/or future locations of the user.
Consider the example in Figure 2 , in which the LPPM outputs a location chosen arbitrarily from the 3x3 square centered on (x, y), {(x + i, y + j), i, j ∈ {−1, 0, 1}}, and in which, in addition, the user moves at most one location per time unit. At time t − 1, shown in Figure 2 (a), the user accesses the LBS from location (2,2), , and the LPPM reports obfuscated location (2,2), . Given the reported location and the LPPM mechanism, the adversary can infer that the user could only have been in the bottomleft 3x3 square of locations, . Moreover, since the user moves at most one location per time unit, the adversary knows that at time t, the user will be somewhere inside the bottom-left 4x4 square (as shown by the arrows in Figure 2(a) ).
At time t, shown in Figure 2 (b), the user accesses again the LBS from location (3,3), , reporting obfuscated location (4,4), . Naïvely, as in Section 2.1, the probability of the adversary correctly guessing the user's real location is 1/9 (any location in the 3x3 square surrounding location (4,4), ). However, recall that the adversary knows from the observation at t−1 that, at time t, the user can only be in the bottom-left 4x4 square. Intersecting this knowledge with the current observation, the adversary can deduce that the user is in the darkened 2x2 square in Figure 2 (b). Therefore, the probability of a correct guess is 1/4, more than twice as much as the naïvely expected 1/9. This example highlights that designing LPPMs disregarding correlation may reduce the privacy of the current location. We formally describe this scenario as Problem 1 in Section 5, and we show how to optimally choose obfuscated exposed locations to avoid this situation. Now, consider the example in Figure ( 3), in which, at time t − 1 (Figure 3(a) ), the user is at location (2,2), , but the LPPM reports (1,1), , instead of reporting (2,2); and at time t (Figure 3(b) ), the user is at (3,3), , and the LPPM reports (4,4), . In this case, the correlation stemming from the user's one-location-per-time-unit movement pattern compromises the real locations at both t − 1 and t. The only two-step trajectory that is compatible with the successive exposure of obfuscated locations (1,1) and (4,4) given the LPPM operation is that the user accessed the LBS from (2,2) followed by (3,3). Strikingly, designing LPPMs disregarding correlation may retroactively compromise the privacy of past locations: the user was safe until the obfuscated location at time t was reported. In Section 5, Problem 2, we show how to choose obfuscated exposed locations at time t so as not to compromise the previous or the current location.
The example just discussed also illustrates that the choice of obfuscated locations can affect future privacy. Consider again the user's predicament at time t: the user reported (1,1) at time t−1 and is now at (3,3) trying to choose an appropriate obfuscated location. Revealing (4,4) is not an option since it would reveal the user's real location at both t − 1 and t. Thus, the unfortunate choice at t − 1 reduces the user's possible choices at t. In other words, future privacy may be proactively compromised by current choices. This scenario is handled as Problem 3 in Section 5, in which we offer a mechanism to choose obfuscated exposed locations so as not to compromise future locations. Finally, taking into account correlation between successively visited places is important because transitions between locations can also be sensitive, even when the individual locations in their own might not be. For instance, visiting the bank to make a big withdrawal, and visiting a government official in charge of land development licensing may not be very sensitive if considered separately, but visiting the official immediately after the bank may be much more sensitive. Another sensitive issue with transitions between locations is that they reveal the direction of travel. For instance, the adversary may learn whether the user enters or exits a building, for example, a hospital.
The conclusion from these examples is that it is important to take into account the correlation between exposed locations when designing LPPMs for frequently queried location-based services, in order to protect all past, current, and future locations. In the following, we introduce our mechanism that allows us to find the optimal way to expose obfuscated locations, that is, maximizing privacy in the best possible way against a strategic adversary.
PROBLEM STATEMENT
In this section, we first explain our probabilistic framework and our assumptions about the protection mechanisms and adversary model. We conclude by sketching the problem that we solve in this article. In Table I , we summarize the notations introduced throughout the section.
User and Adversary
We consider a scenario in which users move in an area partitioned into M discrete regions R = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r M }. We also assume that time is discrete and it is partitioned into different time periods (e.g., morning, afternoon). An event r, t denotes that the user is at location r ∈ R at time t ∈ T . Slightly abusing notation, time-subscripted variable r t will denote the user's location at time t. Typical values from R are r, r i , r j , whereas 11:8 R. Shokri et al. typical time-subscripted locations are r t , r t−1 , r t+1 . In movement, the user connects to an LBS, sharing current location in order to obtain a service.
The adversary is the LBS to which the user connects, or any entity that can eavesdrop on the user-LBS communications. The adversary is passive and curious, whose aim is to discover the location of the user at the query time. The adversary observes the locations sent by the user (protected by the privacy mechanism, as described in the next section), and has some external information about the user's mobility. For simplicity, we assume that the user's mobility is encoded as a Markov chain, although that is not mandatory. Any other model is possible, as long as it allows us to compute probabilities of the user visiting various (sequences of) locations.
Let ψ t (r) be the probability, from the point of view of the adversary, that the user accesses the LBS at time t from location r. Thus, r∈R ψ t (r) = 1 for any time instant t. We note that this quantity is time-dependent (i.e., users may have different access patterns in the morning than in the afternoon). In addition, ψ t (r) can depend on previous LBS accesses that the user has made and the adversary has observed; this dependence on previous accesses will be shown explicitly when needed. Overall, ψ t can be computed by the adversary from the combination of the user's general mobility and previous LBS accesses. We call ψ the user's profile, as it reflects the behavior of the user in accessing the LBS over time, as seen from the point of view of the attacker.
Note, crucially, that ψ t (r) is the adversary's prior information about the user's location at time t, before observing anything at time t.
Location-Privacy Protection Mechanism
As users want to preserve their location privacy when they use the LBS, they employ a local and user-centric LPPM that transforms each true location r into a pseudolocation (or obfuscated location) r ∈ R , which is then sent to the LBS instead of the actual location. For simplicity, we set R = R, though in the most general case, R is the powerset of R. Problem 0 (Section 5) has been extended in this direction [Herrmann et al. 2013] .
The corresponding events r , t are termed pseudoevents or observed events. The transformation from r to r at time t happens probabilistically according to the location obfuscation function implemented by the LPPM: a probability distribution f t (r |r), which can be seen as a matrix whose rows are indexed by the locations r ∈ R and whose columns are indexed by the pseudolocations r ∈ R . For a given location r, the function f t (r |r) defines the probability with which the LPPM selects pseudolocation r as output.
Service Quality Metric
In the aforementioned setting, the LBS response quality depends on the pseudolocation output by the LPPM, not on the user's actual location. The distortion introduced in the observed pseudolocations determines the quality of service that the user experiences. We model the loss of service quality due to obfuscation using a distance function d q (r , r) .
1 This function quantifies the dissimilarity between location r and pseudolocation r . Its value for any pair (r, r ) depends on how the LBS under consideration responds to obfuscated locations, as studied in Micinski et al. [2013] , and also on the user's specific service-quality expectations. In many applications, the service quality can be considered inversely proportional to the physical distance between r and r . For example, applications that find nearby points of interest could give very different responses to r and to r even if they are only a couple of kilometers apart. In contrast, there exist LBSs in which the service quality depends on other criteria, such as whether r is within a region of interest. For a weather forecast application, for instance, any pseudolocation r in the same city as the actual location r would result in a high-quality LBS response. In general, d q can model a broad range of service-quality loss functions, and it is considered as an input to our framework.
The expected quality loss Q loss due to an LPPM f t is computed as an average of d q (r , r) over all r and r :
We assume that users impose a maximum tolerable service quality loss, Q max loss , to prevent the obfuscation function from making the service useless for them. Formally,
This constrains the LPPM obfuscation function f t (r |r), which must not output pseudolocations that, on average, result in a lower quality. We note that the influence of the threshold Q max loss on the LPPM depends on the function d q ; thus, it is also dependent on the type of LBS the user is querying. In the case of an LBS that finds nearby points of interest, where d q is proportional to the physical distance between r and r , enforcing the quality threshold could result in ensuring a maximum allowed distance between these two locations. For the weather application, enforcing the quality threshold could result in setting region boundaries within which locations lead to the same forecast. For other location-based applications, the function d q and the threshold Q max loss can be defined in the same vein.
Location Privacy Metric
The adversary's goal is to infer the user's true location r t after observing the LPPM's output r t at time t. The adversary uses knowledge of the user's profile ψ t to run an inference attack on the observed location r t in order to output estimationsr t of the user's actual location. Formally, the attack result can be described as a probability distribution function h t (r t |r t ), which denotes the probability, according to the adversary, that the user's true location at time t isr t .
We follow the definitionby Shokri et al. [2011b] and quantify the user's location privacy as the adversary's expected error in the inference attack, that is, the expected distortion d p (r, r) between the estimated locationr and the true location r. We compute the expectation over all r, r , andr:
The distortion function d p (.) quantifies the privacy that still persists despite the inference attack. This level of privacy depends on the locations' semantics as well as on the privacy requirements of the user (e.g., users might consider locations inside a hospital more sensitive than other places), and d p (.) must be defined accordingly. For instance, if the user wants to hide just an exact current location (as opposed to hiding a large area around the location), the appropriate distortion function could be the Discrete Metric between the estimated locationr and the actual location r:
Substituting this d p (.) into Equation (3) and performing the summation, we see that the term withr = r disappears, and all terms withr = r survive with d p (r, r) = 1.
In other words, the resulting sum is the total probability attributed to the wrong estimations of r, that is, the probability of error in the estimate.
Alternatively, the user's privacy might depend on the physical distance between the estimated and actual locations. In that case, the distortion function can be equal to the Squared Euclidean distance between these locations:
In general, d p reflects the sensitivity of the user when r is estimated asr. This sensitivity can be due to any semantic relation between r andr. We assume that d p is an input to our framework.
Problem Statement
Having introduced all the components of our framework, we are ready to state precisely the problem that we solve. Given:
(a) a maximum tolerable service-quality loss Q max loss imposed by the user as a bound for Q loss , computed using the quality function d q , and (b) a user profile ψ t , computed from the user's mobility pattern and from the user's previously observed locations, we find the LPPM obfuscation function f t that maximizes the user's location privacy as defined in Equation (3). The solution must consider that the adversary (a) observes the LPPM's output r and (b) is aware of the LPPM's internal algorithm f t , and the user's profile ψ t .
The adversary implements the optimal attack h t that estimates the true location of the user with the least distortion, as measured by d p .
LOCATION PRIVACY GAMES
We formulate the problem of designing LPPMs that are optimal against the strongest strategic adversary as a game. In fact, the problem of finding an LPPM that offers optimal location privacy given the user's profile at a given time instant is an instance of a zero-sum Bayesian Stackelberg game. In a Stackelberg game, the leader-in our case, the user-plays first by choosing an LPPM and committing to it by running it on the user's actual location. The follower-in our case, the adversary-plays next by estimating the user's location, knowing the LPPM to which the user has committed. It is a Bayesian game because the adversary has incomplete information about the user's true location, and plays according to a hypothesis about this location. It is also an instance of a zero-sum game, as the adversary's gain (or loss) is exactly balanced by the loss (or gain) of the user: the information gained (lost) by the adversary is the location privacy lost (gained) by the user, according to the location privacy metric (3). We now proceed to define the steps of the game adapted to our problem:
Step 0. At time t, Nature uses probability distribution ψ t (reflecting the probabilistic model for the mobility and the previously observed locations of the user) to select a location r ∈ R for the user, from which the user accesses the LBS.
Step 1. Given the user's location r, the LPPM uses f t (r |r) to select a pseudolocation r ∈ R , subject to f t complying with the service quality constraint (2).
Step 2. Having observed r , the adversary selects an estimated locationr ∼ h t (r|r ),r ∈ R. The adversary knows the LPPM's probability distribution f t (r |r); he also knows the user's profile ψ t , but, of course, not the true location r. Final Step. The adversary pays an amount d p (r, r) to the user. This amount represents the adversary's error (equivalently, the location privacy of the user).
This description is common knowledge to both the adversary and the user. They both aim to maximize their payoff, that is, the adversary tries to minimize the expected amount that will be paid, while the user tries to maximize it. Next, we describe an optimization problem, which formalizes the objectives of the user and the adversary. We construct two linear programs that-with inputs ψ t , d p , and d q -compute the user's optimal choice of protection mechanism f t as well as the adversary's optimal choice of inference attack h t . We emphasize that, when we use the terms "optimal f t " and "optimal h t " in this article, we mean that they are optimal against each other, that is, they form a game-theoretic equilibrium, which is a solution for a game.
Optimal Strategy for the User
The adversary observes the pseudolocation r output by the LPPM, knowing the function f t (r |r) implemented by the LPPM, and also knowing the user's profile ψ t (.). Thus, the adversary can form the posterior distribution
on the true location r of the user, conditional on the observation r . The adversary's objective is then to chooser to minimize the user's conditional expected privacy, where the expectation is taken under Pr(r|r ). The user's conditional expected privacy for an arbitraryr is
and for the minimizingr it is min r r
If there are multiple values ofr that satisfy Equation (8), then the adversary may randomize arbitrarily among them, including selecting one of them with probability 1. The probability with whichr is chosen in this randomization is h t (r|r ). Of course, h t (r|r ) can be nonzero only for minimizing values ofr; for all other values, h t (r|r ) will be zero. When randomizing, Equation (8) 
Note that if there is only one value ofr satisfying Equation (8), then this value is selected with probability 1 in the randomization, whereas all other values are selected with probability 0; thus, Equation (9) reduces to Equation (8). In this sense, Equation (9) is a generalization of Equation (8), but it should be noted that both expressions compute the same conditional expected privacy.
We see that, for a given r , the user's conditional privacy is given by Equation (8). The probability that r is output by the LPPM is Pr(r ) = r f t (r |r)ψ t (r). Thus, the user's unconditional expected privacy (averaged over all r ) is r Pr(r ) min r r
To facilitate the computations, we define
Incorporating x r into Equation (10), we rewrite the unconditional expected privacy as
which the user aims to maximize by choosing the optimal f t (r |r). The minimum operator makes the problem nonlinear, which is undesirable, but Equation (11) can be transformed to a series of linear constraints:
It turns out that maximizing Equation (12) under Equation (11) is equivalent to maximizing Equation (12) under Equation (13) [Dasgupta et al. 2008, Ch. 7, p. 224] .
We construct the linear program for the user from Equations (12) and (13). Note that variable x r is a decision variable in the linear program, that is, it is among the quantities chosen by the solver. This might appear counterintuitive, as x r is defined in Equation (11) as a function of f t (.), rather than as an independent variable that can be freely selected. But, because of the transformation, it is always guaranteed that Equation (11) will hold.
The linear program for the user is the following: Choose f t (r |r), x r , ∀r, r in order to
r f t (r |r) = 1, ∀r, and f t (r |r) ≥ 0, ∀r, r .
Inequalities (14b) are the series of linear constraints (Equation (13)), repeated for each value of r ; inequality (Equation (14c)) reflects the service quality constraint; constraints (Equation (14d)) reflect that f t (r |r) is a probability distribution function.
Optimal Strategy for the Adversary
To find the adversary strategy that is at a game theoretical equilibrium with the user strategy computed in Equations (14a) to (14d) (i.e., the two strategies are optimal against each other), we construct and solve the linear program that is dual to Equations (14a) to (14d): Choose h t (r|r ), y r , ∀r, r ,r, and z ∈ [0, ∞) to
Note the role of variable z: In linear programming parlance, it is the shadow price of the service quality constraint. Intuitively, z is the "exchange rate" between service quality and privacy. Its value in the optimal solution indicates the amount of privacy (in privacy units) that is lost (gained) if the service quality threshold Q max loss increases (decreases) by one unit of quality.
For example, if z > 0 in the optimal solution, then any change Q max loss in Q max loss will change the privacy achieved by z Q max loss . In this case, constraint (14c) is satisfied as a strict equality. In contrast, if constraint (14c) is satisfied as a strict inequality, then, intuitively, the selection of f t (r |r) has not been constrained by Q max loss . In this case, any (small) changes in Q max loss will have no effect on f t (r |r) or on the privacy achieved. Thus, z would be zero.
Note that both linear programs compute the unconditional expected privacy of the user (3), which we repeat here for convenience.
The optimal solution of each linear program results in the same value for the privacy of the user. Hence, in principle, we only need to compute one of the two to quantify the maximum level of privacy of the user. We choose to present both, because the user's linear program incorporates the service quality constraint in a more straightforward manner, whereas the adversary's linear program explicitly computes the "exchange rate" between service quality and privacy.
LPPM DESIGN IN SPECIFIC SCENARIOS
We now formalize concrete problems, starting with sporadic location exposures and continuing with the problems that were described in Section 2.2.
Compared to our description so far, the variations in the following problems have to do with the previously observed pseudolocations (which affect the attacker's prior knowledge ψ t () about his objective) and with the attacker's objective (which may be not just to estimate the single current location r t , but also past locations r t−1 or future locations r t+1 ; thus, this also affects the computation of ψ t ()). In other words, the central quantity that changes among the various problems is the adversary's prior knowledge about the adversary's objective. For each particular problem, we show how to compute ψ t (), which can then be simply inserted into the linear programs (14) and (15). Finally, we show how one can adapt the framework for arbitrary new problems.
Problem 0: Protecting Privacy of Time t at Time t, With No Previous Exposure
The user has previously not exposed any pseudolocation. Currently, at time t, the user issues the first query, and the LPPM must choose an appropriate obfuscation function that generates r t to protect the user's current location r t .
This problem is equivalent to that of sporadic location privacy, which is relevant for LBSs to which queries are sent sporadically: location check-in, location-tagging, or applications for finding nearby points of interest, local events, or nearby friends. In these services, if there is enough time between queries, then successively exposed locations are independent of each other, that is, previous exposures do not give any information to the attacker about the current exposure.
The relevant prior information in this case is Pr{r t }, which is computed from background knowledge about the area in which the user moves (e.g., if r is in the middle of a lake, then presumably Pr{r t } = 0), and from background knowledge about the user's mobility or habits (e.g., if the attacker knows the user's daily mobility pattern, then at t = 7am Pr{r t } is high for locations around the user's home, and at 11am it is high around the user's workplace). If the mobility is described by a Markov chain, then Pr{r t } can be simply read from the steady-state distribution of the Markov chain. At time t−1, the LPPM exposed pseudolocation r t−1 . Currently, at time t, the user issues another query; thus, the LPPM must choose an appropriate obfuscation r t to protect the user's current location r t . This is the problem shown in Figure 2 (Section 2.2) .
The attacker, having observed r t−1 , has a probabilistic estimate of the user's location at time t − 1, which was previously (at t − 1) computed as h t−1 (r t−1 |r t−1 ). This estimate must be "moved forward" to form a location estimate for time t. If we assume that the user moves according to a Markov chain mobility model, "moving forward" from t − 1 to t is equivalent to multiplying h t−1 (r t−1 |r t−1 ) by the Markov chain transition matrix Pr{r t |r t−1 }. Note that the Markov chain assumption is not necessary for our proposed approach; all we need is a way to compute a location estimate at time t from a location estimate at time t − 1. We make the Markov assumption for convenience; other literature has used simpler models, based on just the velocity of the user [Ghinita et al. 2009 ].
Function Pr{r t |r t−1 }, r t ∈ R is the prior information of the adversary for Problem 1. The LPPM design continues with solving the linear program as in the previous section, computing f (r t |r t , r t−1 ) for a particular value of r t−1 .
Note, however, that the prior information function Pr{r t |r t−1 }, thus the designed LPPM, is different for each value of the previously exposed r t−1 . This is a formal description of the obvious fact that the LPPM to be designed must depend on the exact value of the previously exposed pseudolocation.
This dependence raises the practically important issue of when to compute the appropriate LPPM. One choice is to precompute all LPPMs, one for each possible value of r t−1 (M in total), then copy them to the device. This allows for performing all computations on a powerful, nonresource-constrained machine, but it requires more storage space on the mobile device. The other extreme is to compute the appropriate LPPM when the actual r t−1 becomes known, but this means that the computation has to happen on the mobile device between time t − 1 and time t. Thus, there is a trade-off here, which we explore when discussing computational considerations (Section 6.2).
There are intermediate solutions, such as precomputing and storing LPPMs only for the most frequent pseudolocation values. The probability of each pseudolocation can be computed as
A variant of Problem 1 is when the latest exposure was at time t − k, for a single value of k ≥ 1. Then we compute the prior by multiplying h t−k (r t−k |r t−k ) by the k-th power of the Markov transition matrix. Note here that, if k is large enough, then the effect of h t−k (r t−k |r t−k ) disappears; thus, we are back to the original sporadic problem of protecting privacy at time t with just Pr{r t } as the prior, as if there are no prior exposures. We explore this variant next, for which our general aim is to quantify the effect of multiple past exposures as opposed to just one. In a continuous LBS, users expose more than one pseudolocation in short order. The question is to what extent pseudolocations exposed before t − 1 give information to the adversary about the user's current (time t) location. If pseudolocations far into the past need to be taken into account, then an LPPM that protects the current location would be correspondingly more complex, as each possible combination of past exposures would induce a different optimal current obfuscation; in other words, a different LPPM would have to be computed for each combination.
To answer this question, we compare the sequence of priors Pr{r t }, Pr{r t |r t−1 }, Pr{r t |r t−2 }, . . . . The general term of this sequence, Pr{r t |r t−k } is equal to
The term Pr{r t |r t−k } is the k-step transition probability in a Markov chain mobility model; it is computed as the k-th power of the corresponding transition matrix.
We therefore see that the effect of r t−k on the adversary's prior on the current location comprises two factors: (1) the uncertainty for the true location r t−k at time t − k, which is caused by the obfuscation used at time t − k, and (2) the dissipation effect caused by the k-step transition from t − k to t.
Problem 2: Protecting Privacy of Times t − 1 and t at Time t, for a Given Exposure at t − 1
At time t − 1, the LPPM exposed pseudolocation r t−1 . Currently, at time t, the user issues another query; thus, the LPPM must choose an appropriate obfuscation r t that will protect the current location r t and will not retroactively compromise the user's previous location r t−1 . In other words, the obfuscation r t must be "compatible" with the previously exposed r t−1 . This is the problem shown in Figure 3 (Section 2.2).
The prior information that is available to the adversary before observing r t is Pr{r t , r t−1 |r t−1 } = Pr{r t |r t−1 , r t−1 } Pr{r t−1 |r t−1 } = Pr{r t |r t−1 }h t−1 (r t−1 |r t−1 ).
The first term Pr{r t |r t−1 } is known from the mobility model (e.g., the Markov transition matrix); the second term h t−1 (r t−1 |r t−1 ) is computed at t − 1. Note that, here, the prior information is not just about the current location r t , but rather about the pair (r t , r t−1 ), because that pair is the information that the adversary tries to infer.
Problem 3: Protecting Privacy of Times t + 1 and t at Time t
In this problem, we assume that there are no past exposures of the user's location. The user issues a query at the current time t, the objective of which is to protect not only the current location, but also the location at the next time instant t + 1.
We discussed this scenario at the end of Section 2.2, which is motivated as follows: Disclosing the current location might not be important in and of itself, but it might make it much easier for the adversary to infer the next location, which happens to be very sensitive. For instance, the user might currently be on a street that only leads to an abortion clinic. Hence, disclosing her current location is almost equivalent to disclosing that she will go to the clinic. Symmetrically, her current location might be very sensitive, and her next (expected) location can be linked easily to her current one. For instance, she might be about to leave the abortion clinic and enter a street that is only used as the clinic's exit. Furthermore, neither the current nor the next location might be particularly sensitive separately, but the transition from one to the other might be.
The conclusion in all these cases is that the current location must be protected jointly with the (possible) next one(s) where the user will be at time t + 1. For this reason, the LPPM should compute at the present time t the pseudolocations that it is likely to output at t+1, so that the current choice of r t does not limit future choices. The intuition is that the LPPM should choose the current pseudolocation r t so that future paths that the user will likely take can be protected with pseudolocations compatible with r t .
In this scenario, the prior information of the adversary is about the current (t) and future (t + 1) location of the adversary: Pr{r t+1 , r t } = Pr{r t+1 |r t } Pr{r t }. The first term is known from the Markov transition matrix; the second term is, as in Problem 0, just the steady state of the Markov chain.
As noted earlier, in all four problems, we can compute an appropriate prior probability distribution for the adversary's knowledge about the target locations. This probability distribution is then used as a parameter in the linear program described in the previous section. In Section 5.1, we see how one can write a linear program for a very general set of target locations and prior exposures.
When Problems are Interleaved
As the user moves, she might be facing a different problem at each time, so she would need to compute a succession of different LPPMs. For example, the first time she exposes a location, Problem 0 applies. Then, at the next exposure, Problem 1 or Problem 2 could apply, depending on whether the user wishes to protect just the current location (Problem 1) or both the current and the previously exposed location (Problem 2). The prior probability at each time has to be computed taking into account the past LPPMs and, most important, their corresponding attacks h. It is these attacks that determine the attacker's probabilistic estimate of the user's location at each time, which is then multiplied by the transition probabilities to provide the prior probability for the next time instant.
We now compute the prior probability at time t, t ≥ 2, in an example in which the user originally computed a Problem-0 LPPM at time t = 1, then at every subsequent time instant up to t − 1, she computed a Problem-2 LPPM. She is currently (time t) interested in computing yet another Problem-2 LPPM, hence the prior probability is Pr{r t , r t−1 |r t−1 }. We denote by h spor the Problem-0 attack. The computation of the prior proceeds as follows:
Pr{r t , r t−1 |r t−1 } = Pr{r t |r t−1 , r t−1 }Pr{r t−1 |r t−1 }. 
The first term is the LPPM function f t−1 , as computed at time t − 1 for Problem 2. The third term is known from the mobility model. The second term Pr{r t−2 |r t−2 , r t−1 } is equal to Pr{r t−2 |r t−2 }, because the obfuscation at time t − 2 depends only on r t−2 , r t−3 , Fig. 4 . A user moves from location (3, 4) at time t − 2, to (4,3) at t − 1, to (4, 2) at current time t. The user wants to protect locations at times t − 1 and t, which are denoted by a trg (target events). At past times t − 2 and t − 1, the LPPM exposed pseudolocations (3, 3) and (3, 2) (denoted by o pre ), and to protect a trg , the LPPM currently exposes location (3, 1) (denoted by o post ). and r t−3 . Knowing r t−1 when r t−2 is already known gives us no extra information on r t−3 or r t−3 . Hence, the computation of Pr{r t−1 |r t−1 } is shown to be recursive:
f t−1 (r t−1 |r t−1 , r t−2 , r t−2 )Pr{r t−2 |r t−2 }Pr{r t−2 |r t−1 }.
Having recursively computed Pr{r t−1 |r t−1 }, we substitute it into Equation (22), the result of which is, in turn, substituted into Equation (21) to compute the desired prior.
Location Privacy for a Generic Objective
As we see in the previous sections, many different variants of location privacy can be formulated, depending on the adversary's knowledge (i.e., past exposed pseudolocations), and on the privacy target (i.e., on what the user wishes to protect or, equivalently, on what the adversary wishes to attack). Each combination leads to a different optimal LPPM. In particular, in Problems 2 and 3, we see that the privacy target does not need to be the user's current location. It can be a pair or a tuple of locations; this tuple might not even include the user's current location, for example, if the user only wants to protect a past location by choosing an appropriate pseudolocation at the current time.
We now describe generic terminology and a generic linear program for LPPM design, with the help of the example shown in Figure 4 .
5.1.1. Generic LPPM Parameters.
-a trg denotes the target events that the user wants to protect or, equivalently, the events that the adversary wants to infer. In the example, the user wants to protect her location at times t − 1 and t, thus a trg = (r t−1 , r t ) = { (4, 3), t − 1 , (4, 2), t }. -o pre is a subset of the pseudoevents that the LPPM created and sent to the LBS up to but before the current time. These are the pseudoevents that matter for the estimation of a trg : typically, o pre would be a sequence of consecutive pseudoevents starting with a recent time instant (as old ones do not matter for estimating a trg ) and leading up to the current time. These are known both to the adversary and to the LPPM. In the example, the relevant pseudolocations were exposed at times t − 1 and t − 2; thus, o pre = (r t−2 , r t−1 ) = { (3, 3), t − 2 , (3, 2), t − 1 }. -o post is the pseudolocation (or set of pseudolocations) that the LPPM produces to protect a trg and that will be sent to the LBS at the current time. In the example, at current time t the user exposes pseudolocation (3, 1); thus, o post = (r t ) = { (3, 1), t }.
-f (o post |a trg , o pre ) is the probability that the LPPM produces o post , given its knowledge o pre and the locations a trg that it is trying to protect. This function encodes the defensive mechanism. It can be viewed as a codebook that prescribes, for each value of a trg and o pre , a randomization over the possible values of o post .
Generic Privacy Metric.
As before, privacy is quantified as the adversary's error in estimating the user's true location(s) a trg . Figure 5 illustrates the information flow of events and pseudoevents to the LPPM and to the adversary. The detailed notation is as follows: -ψ(a trg |o pre ) is the adversary's prior probability distribution on the inference target a trg , given the adversary's prior knowledge o pre . It encodes what the adversary can deduce about a trg before observing the LPPM's current output o post . -â trg denotes the adversary's estimate of a trg . Similar to a trg , it can be seen as a timeindexed vector whose elements belong to the set R of locations. -h(â trg |o pre , o post ) is the probability that the adversary estimatesâ trg to be the true value of a trg , given the adversary's knowledge of prior pseudolocations o pre and given the pseudolocation(s) o post exposed at current time t. 
under the quality constraint,
as well as the constraint (omitted) that f should be a probability function.
EVALUATION
The LPPMs that we design are optimal by construction. In this section, we illustrate their privacy-utility performance, and compare them against nonoptimal LPPMs. We also show how the optimal attacks that we compute fare against nonoptimal, but intuitive, LPPMs. We begin with LPPMs and attacks computed for the sporadic case (Problem 0), and we continue with trajectory-aware LPPMs.
Location Obfuscation for Sporadic Exposures
We use real location traces of people (in Lausanne, Switzerland) who use various means of transportation. 2 We select 11 users at random, and focus on their location traces during the day (8am to 8pm), when it is more probable that users employ locationbased services. The length of the considered traces is 1mo. The location area, within which they move, is divided into 300 regions. Figure 6 shows the density of users across all the regions. The grayness of the cells shows the density of its corresponding region in log scale. As many of the regions are abandoned (or very rarely visited) by many individual users, we compute each user's profile ψ(.) by considering only the 30 most popular regions across the whole population. This prevents sparse user profiles. A user's profile is the normalized number of the user's visits to each region.
Given distance functions d p (.) and d q (.) and service-quality loss threshold Q max loss , we compute the optimal LPPM and its corresponding optimal attack by solving Equations (14a) and (15a) using a linear programming solver. We then compare the obtained optimal protection mechanism and the optimal inference attack against the basic obfuscation LPPM and the Bayesian inference attack, respectively. See Figure 7 for an illustration. Distribution Pr(r ) of observed pseudolocations when using the optimal LPPM with Q max loss = 0.8690 (subfigure 2). Distribution Pr(r ) of observed pseudolocations when using obfuscation LPPM with Q loss (ψ, f, d q ) = 0.8690 (subfigure 3). Conditional distribution Pr(r |r) when using the optimal LPPM on location r = (13, 7) (subfigure 4). Conditional distribution Pr(r |r) when using obfuscation LPPM on location r = (13, 7) (subfigure 5). Column 1 is the leftmost column, and row 1 is the bottom row.
Basic Obfuscation LPPM. The basic obfuscation LPPM, with an obfuscation level k = 1, 2, 3, . . . , is constructed in the following way: For each location r, we find its k − 1 closest locations (using the Squared Euclidean distance between the centers of the regions). The LPPM function f (.|r) will be the uniform probability distribution on the set of the k − 1 selected locations together with the location r. That is, location r is replaced by each of the k locations, as a pseudolocation, with the same probability 1 k , and all other locations have probability 0. Thus, in practice, an actual location r is hidden among its k − 1 nearest locations. We choose this mechanism, as it has been very popular in the literature.
Given the user profile ψ(.) and quality distance function d q (.), we use Equation (1) to compute the expected service-quality loss Q loss (ψ, f, d q ) for any LPPM obfuscation f (.), whether it is optimal or not.
Bayesian Inference Attack on an LPPM. We compare the effectiveness of our optimal attack with the Bayesian inference attack, which has been shown effective before [Shokri et al. 2011b] . The Bayesian attack first computes the posterior probability of locations Pr(.|r ):
Then, it setsr to the location that minimizes the expected estimation errorr = arg minr r Pr(r|r )d p (r, r). If the estimation error d p is the Squared Euclidean distance, then the attack selects the conditional expected valuer = E[r|r ] and the resulting expected estimation error is the conditional variance Var [r|r ] . If d p is the Discrete Metric, then the attack selects the location with the highest posterior probabilityr = arg maxr Pr(r|r ); the resulting expected estimation error is 1 − r =r Pr(r|r ). These facts follow from standard Bayesian estimation theory.
The difference between the Bayesian attack and the optimal attack is that the Bayesian attack does not take into account that the LPPM was designed to anticipate the optimal attack against it, nor that the LPPM had a quality constraint. In contrast, both of these facts are incorporated into the linear program that computes the optimal attack. As a result, the Bayesian attack is not optimal against any particular LPPM-definitely not against the optimal defense LPPM that our algorithms design.
Optimal Inference Attack on an Arbitrary LPPM. In order to make a fair comparison between the effectiveness of the optimal and obfuscation LPPM, we need to run the same attack on both of them. The Bayesian inference attack described by Equation (28) can be performed against both. However, we still need to design an optimal attack against arbitrary LPPMs that have not been constructed in our game-theoretic framework.
The optimal inference attack is the one that minimizes the expected user privacy:
Given the user profile ψ(.), an LPPM f (.) and distortion function d p (.), the following linear program finds the optimal attack h(.). Note that, compared to Equation (15a), there is no service quality constraint here, as the LPPM has been assumed to be arbitrary.
subject to r h(r|r ) = 1, ∀r , and h(r|r ) ≥ 0, ∀r, r
Trade-off between Privacy and Service Quality. We now study the trade-off between the level of privacy that the optimal LPPM provides against the optimal attack, and the service-quality loss that it causes. We plot in Figure 8 (a) the evolution of the service-quality loss and the corresponding privacy achieved, as the optimal LPPM is configured with increasingly higher values of service-quality thresholds Q (for users with diverse profiles). Each line in the figure represents one user and each
Unsurprisingly, with higher levels of location-privacy protection comes a significant degradation in service quality. Also, as expected, the maximum achievable location privacy strongly depends on the user profile. This is reflected by the separation between the different lines. However, we also see that each user's privacy increases up to a certain level, then there is no change even when the quality threshold Q max loss is further increased. This is due to the presence of the optimal attack that squeezes the locationprivacy gain.
This effect is further illustrated in Figure 8(b) , in which the service-quality loss of the optimal LPPM is plotted against the service-quality threshold. Once the optimal LPPM offers the maximal location privacy for a given user profile, loosening the service-quality constraint does not significantly change the LPPM's underlying function f ; thus, there is no reduction in service quality. In other words, there is no need to sacrifice any more service quality, even though the looser Q max loss constraint allows it, because doing so does not increase the user's location privacy.
We can draw some parallels with the "shadow price" interpretation of z in the linear program-Section 4.2. In that section, we see that z = 0 means that small changes to Q max loss have no effect on privacy, whereas a positive value of z gives the rate of privacy increase for a small change in Q max loss . Qualitatively, we observe both these effects in the figure (an initial privacy increase with Q max loss , subsequently no effect on privacy as Q max loss increases further). However, note that the "shadow price" interpretation is only valid for small changes of Q max loss ; thus, strictly speaking, we cannot quantitatively link the values of z to the observed privacy changes in the figure.
Optimal LPPM and Attack are Better than Basic LPPM and Bayesian Attack. Given Squared Euclidean distance functions d p (.) and d q (.), we compute the optimal LPPM and attack methods for a set of service-quality thresholds Q max loss . For each user, we run the Bayesian inference attack on the user's optimal LPPM. We also evaluate the location privacy offered by the basic obfuscation LPPM with respect to the optimal attack. We vary the obfuscation level from 1 (minimum) to 30 (maximum); for each level, we compute the corresponding quality loss. Then, this value is set as the threshold Q max loss in the computation of the optimal attack mechanism.
Figure 9(a) shows the superiority of the optimal attack to the Bayesian attack when location privacy of users is protected using the optimal LPPM. For any given user and service-quality threshold, the location privacy that the user obtains is smaller when the adversary implements the optimal strategy rather than the Bayesian attack.
Figure 9(b) shows the superiority of the optimal LPPM to the obfuscation LPPM, against the optimal attack. For any given user and service-quality threshold, a user has a higher privacy level when the LPPM implements the optimal strategy. Note that the privacy levels achieved by the two mechanisms approach each other and eventually become equal when very little service quality is guaranteed for the user (i.e., when Q max loss is set to its maximum value). When the quality requirement becomes increasingly looser, both mechanisms add so much noise that the adversary, in effect, learns nothing new about the user's true location.
Location Obfuscation Over a Trajectory
So far, we have analyzed the behavior of optimal LPPMs in the sporadic setting. In this section, we focus on LPPMs that take the previous exposed locations into account. We also evaluate transition privacy.
For the comparison to the sporadic LPPM and for illustration of the privacy-quality trade-off, we use a real dataset of location traces. These traces, which are one day long, belong to 10 randomly chosen mobile users (vehicles) in the San Francisco Bay area from the epfl/mobility dataset at CRAWDAD. We divide the Bay Area into 10 × 25 equal-sized locations, and consider a day to be composed by 288 time units, one per each 5 minutes. We emphasize that the granularity of both time and locations can be arbitrarily selected depending on the required accuracy in quantifying privacy and service quality. We consider all the locations that are visited by each user, which is 23.4 locations per user, on average. We also consider all the transitions that each user has made between these locations in our dataset.
Without loss of generality, we select the privacy gain d p and the quality loss d q functions to be the Discrete Metric: d p (â trg , a trg ) = 1â trg =a trg and d q (q trg , o post , o pre ) = Fig. 10 . Users' single-location privacy, using a sporadic LPPM against two attacks: sporadic attack versus correlation-aware attack. For 10 different users (lines), and for various values of the service-quality threshold Q max loss (dots), we see that the privacy against a correlation-aware attack (x-axis) is always less than the privacy against a sporadic attack (y-axis).
1 q trg =(o post ,o pre ) . Taking the privacy gain as an example, using the Discrete Metric implies that we consider it bad for privacy only when the attacker correctly estimates the exact value of the target locations (i.e., whenâ trg is exactly equal to a trg ). All other estimates are equally good for privacy, regardless, for example, of the physical distance between the attacker's estimate and the true value of a trg . Our quantification of privacy is the expected value of d p (â trg , a trg ), and the expected value of 1â trg =a trg is just the probability ofâ trg = a trg , which is the adversary's probability of error.
For the maximum tolerable quality loss Q max loss , we do not specify a single value; rather, we compute the achievable privacy for multiple values to observe the privacy-quality trade-off.
For the previously reported events o pre , we do not specify a single value. Instead, the privacy values that we compute are averaged over all possible values of o pre , because such an average is more representative of the privacy that a user can expect to achieve:
Comparison to Optimal Sporadic LPPM. A trajectory-oblivious (sporadic) LPPM is typically evaluated against an attack that is also sporadic, that is, an attack in which location correlation is not taken into account. To provide quantitative justification for the inadequacy of such LPPMs and their evaluation when the exposed locations are correlated, we show in Figure 10 that a correlation-aware attack can achieve much lower privacy than a sporadic attack.
A sporadic LPPM protects single locations only; thus, to compare meaningfully, we pick as the objective of the correlation-aware attack the single-location privacy objective, that is, a trg = r t . The difference between the correlation-aware attack and the sporadic attack is that the former uses the conditional prior probability on the target location ψ(r t |o pre ) (for o pre = o t−1 ), whereas the latter uses the unconditional prior ψ(r t ).
Each attack is paired against the same sporadic LPPM. The results are plotted across the 10 mobile users and for various values of the service-quality threshold Q max loss . As all data points are below the x = y diagonal, we conclude that privacy in the correlationaware attack (x-axis) is lower than privacy in the sporadic attack (y-axis). The only cases in which the two attacks are equally (un)successful are when the quality loss threshold is so high that the sporadic LPPM can inject enough noise to blur even the inference of a correlation-aware attack.
Privacy-Quality Trade-off. Here, we illustrate the privacy-quality trade-off of our LPPMs for two particular scenarios: protecting single-location privacy for the current location, taking into account the immediately previous pseudolocation (a trg = r t and o pre = o t−1 ), shown in Figure 11 (a); and protecting transition privacy for the current and future locations (a trg = (r t , r t+1 )), shown in Figure 11 (b) .
Under each of these scenarios, we construct the optimal protection mechanism for each of the 10 users in our traces (i.e., the mechanism that provides the maximum privacy for the user). We plot this maximum privacy as a function of the servicequality threshold Q max loss . We see in both figures that the achievable privacy increases as Q max loss increases (as higher values of Q max loss let the LPPM inject more noise). Similar to the sporadic case, we observe two effects: first, a saturation effect takes place for most users as Q max loss increases. Their privacy reaches a plateau beyond which any further increase in Q max loss does not increase privacy. Second, the privacy plateau, as well as the privacy level for any value of Q max loss , differs for each user, indicating that there is an inherent per-user privacy limit that is connected to how predictable the user's mobility is.
Computational Considerations. Our mechanism is intended to becomputed offline and used online: The LPPM function f (o post |a trg , o pre ) is precomputed offline, then downloaded to the device. Then, whenever the user attempts to expose a location, the LPPM looks up and performs the appropriate randomization on pseudolocations o post based on the actual values of the target events to be protected a trg and the previously exposed vector of pseudolocations o pre . In this way, the only computational burden of the mobile device is a look-up and a randomized selection of o post .
The offline computation of the LPPM function f requires solving a separate linear program for each value of o pre that may arise in practice. However, most of the theoretically possible values of the vector o pre are nonsensical sequences of locations, for example, sequences in which successive locations are too far away from each other; thus, these need not be taken into account, which saves considerable time. Similarly, the number of variables in each linear program is theoretically equal to the total number of pairs of a trg and o post vectors, since a value for f must be computed for each such combination. This number is M length(a trg )+length(o post ) (recall that M is the total number of locations). In practice, however, it is much smaller. The actual number of linear programs and variables is closer to the number of likely trajectories of the corresponding length (the number of linear programs is equal to the number of trajectories of length length(o pre ), whereas the number of variables is equal to the number of trajectories of length length(a trg ) + length(o post )).
It is very important to note also that the computation of f needs to be done only once; thus, the associated cost needs to be incurred only once. A recomputation of f is necessary only if, for example, the user parameters or application parameters d p , d q , Q max loss change, or if the user wants to protect a different aspect of one's privacy (e.g., previous, present, and next location, instead of just present and next location), which would translate to a change in a trg , or if one wishes to take into account different prior knowledge of previously reported pseudolocations o pre (e.g., take into account the 3 previously reported pseudolocations instead of just one).
RELATED WORK
Location privacy has been a very active area of research in recent years. Work on this topic can be roughly classified in three categories: mainly focused on the design of LPPMs; mainly focused on recovering actual user trajectories from anonymized or perturbed traces; or mainly focused on the formal analysis and the search for appropriate location privacy metrics to allow for fair comparison between LPPMs.
Existing LPPMs are built according to different design principles. The most popular approach to obtaining location privacy is to send a space-or time-obfuscated version of the users' actual locations to the service provider [Gedik and Liu 2005; Gruteser and Grunwald 2003; Hoh et al. 2007; Kalnis et al. 2007] . A different approach consists of hiding some of the users' locations by using mix zones [Beresford and Stajano 2003; ] or silent periods [Jiang et al. 2007 ]. These are regions where users do not communicate with the provider while changing their pseudonym. Provided that several users traverse the zone simultaneously, this mechanism prevents an adversary from tracking them, as the adversary cannot link those who enter with those who exit the region. A third line of work protects location privacy by adding dummy requests, indistinguishable from real requests, issued from fake locations to the service provider [Chow and Golle 2009] . The purpose of these fake locations is to increase the uncertainty of the adversary about the users' real movements.
The predictability of users' location traces, and the particular constraints of users' movements, has been shown to be sufficient to reconstruct and/or identify anonymous or perturbed locations. An adversary can, to name but a few possibilities, infer users' activities from the frequency of their visits to certain locations [Liao et al. 2007 ]; reidentify anonymous low-granularity location traces given the users' mobility profiles [De Mulder et al. 2008 ]; or derive [Hoh et al. 2006] and reidentify [Golle and Partridge 2009; Krumm 2007 ] the home address of individuals from location traces.
Several authors have made efforts toward formalizing the desirable location privacy requirements that LPPMs should fulfill, as well as toward finding suitable metrics to evaluate the degree to which these requirements are fulfilled. Examples of these lines of work are Krumm [2007] , Decker [2009] , and Duckham [2010] . revisit existing LPPMs and the location-privacy metrics used in their evaluation. They classify these metrics in three categories: uncertainty-based (entropy), error-based, and k-anonymity. The authors conclude, by means of a qualitative evaluation, that metrics such as entropy and k-anonymity are not suitable for measuring location privacy. In a follow-up of thiswork, Shokri et al. [2011a Shokri et al. [ , 2011b provide a framework to quantify location privacy. The framework allows us to specify an LPPM and then to evaluate various questions about the location information leaked. Our design methodology uses this analytical framework as an evaluation tool to quantifying the LPPMs' offered privacy against the localization attack.
Specifically for protecting trajectory privacy (i.e., consecutive location exposures), a first class of mechanisms in the literature protect user privacy when trajectories are published in bulk. Protection is achieved by grouping trajectories of different users in a wide area to ensure that the aggregate trajectory can be ascribed to at least k users [Abul et al. 2008] ; mixing the trajectories of k users [Nergiz et al. 2009 ]; eliminating some events from the published dataset [Hoh et al. 2010; Terrovitis and Mamoulis 2008] ; or replacing locations with larger regions defined by a predefined grid [Gidófalvi et al. 2007] . Along similar lines, some protection algorithms need access to the complete trajectory before protection can be applied [You et al. 2007 ], or they delay the exposure of queries to gather additional information about subsequent user locations [Ghinita et al. 2009; Ardagna et al. 2012] . In contrast, our approach decides in real time how to protect a given location that the user is about to expose.
Other trajectory-aware mechanisms assume the existence of a trusted third party (e.g., the cellular service provider) [Pan et al. 2009; Gao et al. 2013] , or assume that nearby users are present and can be leveraged to achieve joint privacy protection [Beresford and Stajano 2003; Huang et al. 2006] . Both of these scenarios violate the user-centricity design requirement in this article. Not depending on other users is also the reason why k-anonymity does not apply in our case, as well as any other method that attempts to make users indistinguishable.
Despite the extent to which location privacy has been studied, there is a patent disconnection between these different lines of work. Most of the aforementioned papers use different models to state the problem and evaluate location privacy. This hinders the comparison of systems and slows down the design of robust LPPMs. Further, in some of these papers, there is a detachment between the proposed design and the adversarial model against which it is evaluated. Often, the considered adversary is static in its knowledge and disregards the information leaked by the LPPM algorithm; or adversarial knowledge is not even considered in the evaluation. The works by and Shokri et al. [ , 2011a Shokri et al. [ , 2011b do consider a strategic adversary that exploits the information leaked by the LPPM in order to compute location privacy. Nevertheless, their work does not address how this privacy computation can be integrated into the design of location-privacy preserving mechanisms.
In this work, we bridge the gap between design and evaluation of LPPMs. We provide a systematic method for developing LPPMs; our method maximizes users' location privacy while guaranteeing a desired level of service quality. We formalize the optimal design problem as a Bayesian Stackelberg game similar to previous work on security in which, as in our location-privacy scenario, the defender can be modeled as a Stackelberg game leader and the adversary as the follower. The common theme with this previous work is that the defender must commit to a defense strategy/protocol, which is then disclosed to the adversary, who can then choose an optimal course of action after observing the defender's strategy. Paruchuri et al. [2008] propose an efficient algorithm for finding the leader's optimal strategy, considering as a main case study a patrolling agent who searches for a robber in a limited area. In their case, the defender is unsure about the type of the adversary (i.e., where the adversary will attack). In contrast, in our work, it is the adversary who is unsure about the type (i.e., the true location) of the user/defender. A similar approach is used by Liu and Chawla [2009] in the design of an optimal e-mail spam filter, taking into account that spammers adapt their emails to get past the spam detectors. The same problem is tackled by Brückner and Scheffer [2011] , who further compare the Stackelberg-based approach with previous spam filters based on support vector machines, logistic regression, and Nash-logistic regression. Korzhyk et al. [2011] contrast the Stackelberg framework with the more traditional Nash framework, within a class of security games. Manshaei et al. [2013] explore the connections between security and game theory more generally. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first that uses Bayesian Stackelberg games to design optimal privacy-protection mechanisms.
The only other formal approach to measuring and protecting privacy that we are aware of is by Andrés et al. [2013] , who extend the concept of differential privacy to sporadic location privacy, thus defining a new privacy metric: geo-indistinguishability. They also propose a mechanism to achieve it optimally [Bordenabe et al. 2014] . In later work , geo-indistinguishability is extended to correlated location traces. To achieve this extended notion of geo-indistinguishability, the concrete mechanism proposed reports the previous pseudolocation (i.e. r t = r t−1 ) if that is acceptable in terms of quality (i.e., if r t−1 is close enough to r t ) or adds zero-mean Laplacian noise to the true location r t otherwise. The main feature of geoindistinguishability in both the sporadic and correlated settings is that it does not use any information about the adversary's prior knowledge, whereas our approach does. We consider this to be a design choice for the LPPM designer, rather than an objective advantage or disadvantage of one method over the other, as it, in effect, models a different adversary. If the LPPM designer wants to protect against an adversary with some background knowledge, then our approach is the only one possible. Otherwise, one can use either our approach with an uninformative prior (i.e., with a uniform prior over all possible locations), or the no-prior approach. The technical difference between the two is that our approach aims to maximize the Bayesian estimation error, whereas no-prior approaches aim to keep the likelihoods of nearby locations close to each other.
In a recent work, Shokri [2015] shows how to combine the two notions of differential and distortion privacy, and how to optimize their joint effect on privacy and utility. However, it does not address trajectories and correlated locations.
CONCLUSION
Accessing location-based services from mobile devices entails a privacy risk for users, since sensitive information can be inferred from the locations they visit. This information leakage raises the need for robust LPPMs. In this article, we have proposed a game-theoretic framework that enables a designer to find the optimal LPPM for a given location-based service, ensuring satisfactory service quality for the user. This LPPM is designed to provide user-centric location privacy; thus, it is ideal for implementation in mobile devices.
Our method accounts for the fact that the strongest adversary not only observes the perturbed location sent by the user but also knows the algorithm implemented by the protection mechanism. Thus, the adversary can exploit the information leaked by the LPPM's algorithm to reduce uncertainty about the user's true location. In our approach, the user is aware of the adversary's knowledge and does not make any assumption about the attacker's computation power. The user thus prepares the protection mechanism against the strongest possible attack by modeling the problem as a Bayesian Stackelberg competition.
We have validated our method using real location traces. We have demonstrated that our approach finds the optimal attack for a given LPPM and service-quality constraint, and we have shown that it is superior to other LPPMs, such as basic location obfuscation. We have also shown that the superiority of the optimal LPPM over alternatives is more significant when the service-quality constraint imposed by the user is tightened. Therefore, our solution is effective exactly where it will be used. Finally, our results confirm that loosening the service-quality constraint allows for increased privacy protection, but the magnitude of this increase strongly depends on the user profile, that is, on the degree to which a user's location is predictable from the user's LBS access profile. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first framework to explicitly include the adversarial knowledge into a privacy-preserving design process, considering the common knowledge between the privacy protector and the attacker.
